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This paper considers current contradictions in state–business relations in Russia. On one
hand, the Russian political elite needs economic growth to keep social stability in the
country and to limit mass protesting in big cities. Economic growth is impossible without
investment, which explains Russian leaders’ increased interest in improving Russia’s
business climate. On the other hand, inﬂuential interest groups (represented ﬁrst of all by
security and law enforcement agencies) try to expand their control on rent sources in the
economy. These groups of interests could strengthen their positions due to fear of political
protests. This strong conﬂict among different groups in the Russian elite creates additional
uncertainty for investors and the business community, and can lead to economic recession
independent of the level of oil prices and dynamics of global markets. Reversing these
negative trends in economic development will be possible only with collective actions of
different economic and political actors (including technocrats in federal and regional
governments, representatives of large and successful middle-sized business and top-
managers of public sector organizations) in the search for pragmatic solutions to the
challenges faced by Russian economy and society.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Modernization of economy and society is a problem that
Russia has been trying to resolve for many centuries.
Moreover, there is a certain cyclic recurrence of the projects
of modernization, which the Russian elite has been
implementing in intervals of several decades: a regulararch Center, Hanyang
r
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hainterchange of the policy of “modernization from above” in
attempt to prepare conditions for “modernization from
below”.
The Soviet experiment of 1917–1991, undoubtedly, was
a large-scale project of modernization from above.
Centralization and huge redistribution of human, physical,
and ﬁnancial resources in the framework of planned
economy enabled the Soviet Union to create well-
developed heavy industry, to win a victory over Nazi Ger-
many in World War II, to make signiﬁcant achievements in
science and technology, and to ensure a strategic military
parity with the United States. However, it became evident
in the mid-1950s that the Soviet planned economy was
losing competition with market economy by the criterion
of living conditions of its common citizens.
The Soviet elite, constrained by ideological dogmas,
found in the mid-1960s that it was unable to give adequatenyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1 A striking example of such a conﬂict was a “public discussion” be-
tween Vladislav Surkov, vice-premier of the Government of the RF, and
General Vladimir Markin, spokesman of the Investigative Committee,
related to an investigation of ﬁnancial improprieties in the innovation
center “Skolkovo” – see http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/
videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id¼1880
and http://izvestia.ru/news/549923#ixzz2SZZvlO2z.
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lutions of imminent problems. Exploration of oil and gas
ﬁelds in Western Siberia in the late 1960s and a surge of oil
prices in 1974 made it easy to do: the Soviet elite was able
to lessen internal social pressure in the country using
massive importation of consumer goods and foods, bought
with proceedings from oil and gas exports.
The Gorbachev reforms in the second half of the 1980s
(introduction of glasnost, expansion of the scale of inde-
pendent decision-making at state enterprises) can be
regarded as a new attempt of modernization, counting on
initiative from below. However, moral degradation of the
elite and deep structural imbalances, which had accumu-
lated in preceding decades, resulted in the Gorbachev re-
forms actually contributing to the disintegration of the
USSR and to the deepening of its economic crisis (Robinson,
1995; Sakwa, 2013).
Further reforms, implemented under Boris Yeltsin in the
1990s, led to the establishment of a market economy
(although with distorted structure and stimuli). However,
these reforms did not resolve the problems and gave no
answer to the challenges that the country (now Russia, not
the Soviet Union) had faced as early as the 1970–1980s:
lack of sufﬁcient incentives for innovation and lagging
behind developed countries in terms of labor productivity
and living standards.
Against this background, the economic policy of the
2000s, as I believe following some other scholars (Lane,
2008; Malle, 2013), was a new attempt of “modernization
from above”, oriented towards construction of a speciﬁc
Russian model of state capitalism. The concept of “vertical
of power” was one of the key features of this model. It
presumed centralization of management and concentra-
tion of ﬁnancial resources in the hands of the Kremlin and
the Federal Government. Substantial restriction of regional
powers and reduction in the inﬂuence of big business on
politics were logical outcomes of this policy (contrary to
the situation of state capture, which had been typical of the
1990s and was analyzed in Hellman, Geraint, and
Kaufmann (2003), Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya
(2005) and other papers). This approach to moderniza-
tion, perhaps, was based on inner conviction of the new
Russian leaders, as well as, in a certain sense, representing a
reaction to the failures of “modernization from below” that
had been attempted in the time of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
David Lane deﬁned this process as transition ‘from chaotic
to state-led capitalism’ and considered it mostly positive
(Lane, 2008).
However, weak points of this model became evident as
soon as the mid-2000s. In particular, construction of the
“vertical of power” resulted in consolidation of positions of
the bureaucratic machine, which became the main social
foundation of the regime after the Yukos affair (Yakovlev,
2006). Nevertheless, the interests of expanded federal bu-
reaucracy did not coincide with the interests and goals of
the top political elite. In my opinion, the economic and
social development of the country became, along with
satisfaction of private interests, a part of the top political
leaders’ priorities. “National projects” designed for the
development of education, public health, and housing, as
well as infrastructure projects related to the 2012 APECSummit in Vladivistok and the 2014 Olympics in Sochi are
examples. However, the interests of bureaucrats in the
middle and lower tiers of the state machine, which was out
of social control in the absence of political competition,
were more focused on receiving rent from informal control
over ﬂows of ﬁnancial resources.
This conﬂict between interests of top political elite and
rent-seeking elitist groups was most apparently displayed
after the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009. To overcome
this crisis, the Government resorted to large-scale expan-
sion of social commitments (Simachev et al, 2009). As a
result, the amount available for distribution of natural rent
substantially decreased. This aggravated internal conﬂicts
in the Russian elite,1 which further increased uncertainty, a
decline in capital investment, and intensive capital outﬂow.
In other words, it became evident that the model of
governance established in the 2000s was inadequate for
the situation of the post-crisis world.
Recognition of this fact incentivized a search for a new
model of economic development. This search was made by
experts representing different ﬂanks of the ideological and
political spectrum. The new version of the “Strategy 2020”,
prepared in 2011 (http://2020strategy.ru/), can be regarded
as a collective product of the liberal part of the expert
community and a reﬂection of views of liberally oriented
elitist groups. On the contrary, policy declarations of the
Izborsk Club, which was established in 2012 (http://www.
dynacon.ru/), are a reﬂection of views of the conservative
wing of the Russian elite.
It is worth pointing out that the choice in favor of one or
another model has not yet been made in the real economic
policy. In her recent papers Silvana Malle (2012, 2013)
provided very detailed analysis of the main features and
contradictions of Russian economic policy after the global
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009. We are going to try to sup-
plement this analysis, using new approaches of institu-
tional economics and centering on a single, although very
important, aspect: the change in relationship between the
state and business after the crisis of 2008–2009, particu-
larly since 2011.
2. New business climate policy and concept of ‘limited
access orders’
The fact that business conditions in Russia are unfa-
vorable has been discussed for a long time (see Golikova,
Gonchar, Kuznetsov, & Yakovlev, 2007; Hellman et al.,
2003; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2003; Puffer, McCarthy, &
Zhuplev, 1998; Yasin, Grigoriev, Kuznetsov, Danilov, &
Kosygina, 2006, etc.). However, Russian authorities
recently began to make visible efforts to change the in-
vestment climate. Thus, in February 2012, Vladimir Putin
announced the 100 steps program, which is aimed at
3 Respective statistics for many developing countries and an explana-
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Business rating compiled by the World Bank and at estab-
lishing a post of Presidential commissioner for entrepre-
neurs’ rights. That announcement was followed by the
development of road maps for the simpliﬁcation of getting
access to electricity and obtaining construction permits, the
change of customs regulations, and the promotion of ex-
ports. In September 2012, a special presidential decree was
passed regarding governors’ activity evaluations regarding
the business climate in their regions. What caused turn-
around toward business, and why had it not happened
earlier?
To answer that question, it would be useful to consider
the situation in Russia from the point of view of a new
concept formulated in the latest works of Douglass North
and his co-authors (see North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast,
2007, 2012; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009 – hereinafter
these works are referred to as NWW), which aimed to
interpret the recorded human history.2 According to the
NWW concept, well-functioning markets and developed
democracy are ideal, but the majority of modern societies
are functioning within the framework of imperfect in-
stitutions. The state in such societies does not have a mo-
nopoly on legitimate violence using the terms of Max
Weber; rather, the state is a coalition of inﬂuential social
groups, each of which has its own violence potential.
Under the NWW concept, such inﬂuential social groups
historically form the societal elite. Additionally, inﬂuential
groups have a choice: The groups can refrain from using
violence against their fellow citizens and protect them
against external threats or, with the help of their force po-
tential, the groups can take away the assets and incomes of
other less inﬂuential groups. The “war against all” described
in the latter case kills any incentives for productive activity
and reduces total income. Therefore, elites tend tomutually
agree to terminate hostilities and form the ruling coalition.
However, such a non-aggressionpact can be stable only if its
participants obtain sufﬁcient compensation for their
abstention from violence and are able to collectively sup-
press any breaches of the agreements. NWW deﬁne such
societies as ‘limited access orders’ (LAO) and stress that so-
cial and political stability (as preconditions of economic
growth) can be supported in LAOs only through the creation
and distribution of rent. But at the same time, capture of all
rents by the ruling coalition and excessive barriers for
newcomerswill reduce incentives for economic activity and
can lead to regression and crisis in LAOs.
A sharp reduction in rent, especially if it is one-time,
affords ground for the revision of agreements and
changes in the ruling coalition. When rent decreases elites
either start a “war against all” again or attempt to reach a
new agreement. The latter outcome is more probable if the
ruling coalition comprises of a wide circle of social groups,
which are capable of solving the problems that the society2 It should be noted that this new concept has already become popular
with experts in Russian studies. Particularly, different aspects of Soviet
and post-Soviet development based on this concept are analyzed in the
papers of Paneyakh and Titaev (2012), Orekhovsky (2012), Zweynert
(2012), Yakovlev (2012a, 2012b).is facing. Thus, social and economic development may be
considered the process of gradual extension of access to
economic opportunities and political activity, as the
involvement of new participants results in greater stability.
The stability of the rules is especially important in the
context of shock impact – when a country faces economic
crises, or social or political shocks.
The NWWapproach is quite different from the ideas and
principles that underlay the World Bank recommendations
for conducting reforms in developing and transition econ-
omies in the 1990s. Speciﬁcally, theWorld Bank programsof
privatization, deregulation, and foreign trade liberalization
resulted in the removal of barriers to business activity and
led to increases in economic efﬁciency. However, the
removal of barriers diluted rent sources, which set the basis
for the existence of the ruling coalition, and the groups that
possessed violence potential had an incentive to use
violence. For this reason, in many developing countries,
liberal and democratic reforms were accompanied by crime
waves, serious social conﬂicts, and civil wars. Such trends
were also typical of many countries in the post-Soviet area.33. Rules of the game in the 1990s and early 2000s
It has been well-established in the literature that the
size and stability of rent ﬂows are the essentials of the
Russian economy that determine the relationship between
society, the development of institutions, and economic
dynamics (see, e.g., Åslund, 1996, 2004; Boone & Rodionov,
2002; Gurvich, 2010). In the 1990s, the main sources of
rents were privatization, an enormous price difference for
the same goods in the domestic and world market, and
domestic and international borrowing. The key players
were the federal and regional bureaucracies and oligarchic
businesses. However, all of the rent sources were largely
temporary. By the second half of the 1990s, the most
attractive assets had been privatized, the difference be-
tween domestic prices and world market prices for con-
sumer goods and raw materials started to disappear, and
the Russian debt burden reached a critical level. Mean-
while, the lack of agreements among elites regarding
mutual consideration of interests and the non-observance
of uniform rules led to chaos and entailed widespread
non-payments and a permanent property redistribution.
Such a “virtual economy” could not last long and it
collapsed in August 1998.
The default of short-term state treasury bills (GKO) and
sharp devaluation of the ruble not only became an eco-
nomic shock but also resulted in serious political changes
when, for the ﬁrst time since 1991, the government was
included representatives of the communist party.4 As ation of the upward trend in political violence from the economic theory
point of view are given in the recent work by Besley and Torsten (2011).
4 Thus, Yuri Maslyukov became the ﬁrst vice-premier in charge of
economic policy and all economic agencies in the government of Yevgeny
Primakov. Before this appointment he was a notable CPRF ﬁgure, the
former Chairman of the USSR Gosplan and a member of Politburo of the
CPSU Central Committee. Another member of CPRF fraction in State
Duma Gennady Khodyrev became the Minister for antimonopoly policy.
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new Russian elite. The largest loss from the crisis was
inﬂicted on the middle class. Nevertheless, representatives
of the elite understood that in the case of another social
cataclysm, they could lose their status and their assets. The
awareness of that threat motivated different groups of elite
to negotiate the new agreement, which created conditions
for economic development.
Highly typical is the “Gref’s reform” case, particularly its
tax component. Technically, all tax reform drafts were
written in the Centre for Strategic Research under the di-
rection of German Gref in spring 2000. But, in fact, this
reform’s basic agreements were reached earlier – in active
informal negotiations, which had been ongoing since the
end of 1998 between different elite groups on different
grounds (including the Council for Foreign and Defense
Policy, Club-2015 and several others).5 Those negotiations
brought the understanding that an economy cannot exist
without a state, but a state cannot function without taxes.
However, businesses were unable to pay taxes under the
irrational rules that had been introduced in Russia in the
1990s. Those rules had to be changed, but it was not suf-
ﬁcient merely to adjust the taxation rules in accordance
with common sense. In exchange for paying taxes, the
business elite wanted the state to establish at least minimal
order and to provide law enforcement and investments in
infrastructure and the social sphere. As stressed Pauline
Luong and Erika Weinthal (2004) the mutual consent of
the bureaucratic and business elite became a precondition
for the quick implementation of a radical tax reform (with
simpliﬁcation of tax administration, introduction of a ﬂat
income tax rate, and regression of the uniﬁed social tax),
further business legalization, and sharp growth of tax
revenues. All of those factors together, to a large extent,
induced the successful development of the Russian econ-
omy in the early 2000s.
Such agreements on the new rules became possible only
because of the 1998 crisis, which destroyed the old rent
sources (connected with the GKO pyramid, exchange rate,
tax arrears, and non-payment offsets) and revealed new
potential rent sources based on economic growth. Specif-
ically, after the ruble devaluation and the disappearance of
the “GKO pump”, it became clear that enterprises priva-
tized in the 1990s, which were often considered by their
new owners only to be sources of asset-stripping, could
bring proﬁts from their core business. That understanding,
on one hand, caused a newwave of property redistribution
(with manipulations of the norms of bankruptcy law and of
law on joint stock companies). However, on the other hand,
the change of external conditions became an incentive for
businessmen to start developing production, investing, and
negotiating the new rules.
The period of 1999–2003 is interesting because the state
attempted to create new organizations for the collective
representation of business interests, and it adhered to the
rationale of the NWW concept. Particularly, the Russian5 One of the results of that dialogue became the project ‘Scenarios for
Russia’, implemented by Club-2015 in 1998–1999s (see http://www.
club2015.ru).Union of Industrialists andEntrepreneurs (RSPP), the largest
and most inﬂuential business association, established by
Arkady Volsky in 1990, was reformed. Initially, RSPP united
directors of large state-owned and privatized enterprises,
but mostly did not include representatives of new private
companies. As stressed Hanson and Teague (2005), in the
1990s, RSPP was in opposition to the government. In 2000
the RSPP management structure was reorganized and the
Bureau of RSPP Board was set up, which was comprised of
owners of all of the largest private and state-owned com-
panies. Since summer 2000, meetings of Russian President
Vladimir Putinwith the Bureau of RSPPBoardwere held two
times a year, where the board discussed problems facing
business and governmental initiatives in economic policy.
Although no formal decisions were made at such meetings,
they were objectively extremely important for the coordi-
nation of plans on both sides – the state and big business.
Thesemeetings undoubtedly facilitated the development of
more adequate economic policy and reduced uncertainty
and risks facing businesses.6
Along with the RSPP reform in 2000–2001, two new all-
Russian business associations were established: OPORA of
Russia expressed the interests of small business, and Delo-
vaya Rossiya (‘Business Russia’) represented the interests of
medium-sized companies. These associations’ activities led
to reforms aimed at reduction of administrative barriers to
small business (including simpliﬁcation of registration and
licensing procedures and reduction of the number of su-
pervisory bodies’ inspections). In addition to the previously
mentioned tax reform (with simpliﬁcation of the taxation
system, introduction of aﬂat income tax rate, and regressive
rates of the uniﬁed social tax), material alterations were
conducted in the customs regulation system, such as uniﬁ-
cation and reduction of customs tariffs. On a whole, all of
those measures resulted in noticeable legalization of
Russian business (it was mostly semi-legal in 1990s) and
signiﬁcant growth of tax payments to the federal budget.
Restoration of the law enforcement system capacity led
to suppression of criminal activity and squeezing crime
bosses out of business and politics. The early 2000s were
also characterized by decreasing levels of violent pressure
on business, which was facilitated by the restructuring of
accumulated tax debt, simpliﬁcation of the tax system, and
liquidation of the Federal Tax Police Service.
Thus, in Russia in the early 2000s, there was a trend of
maintenance of dialogue between the state and business,
which created preconditions for economic development
and forming of the “rule of law for the elite” in the un-
derstanding of NWW concept of “limited access order”.
However, since the mid-2000s, those tendencies have been
explicitly reversed. What caused that turnaround?
4. Natural rent, the Yukos affair and changes in the
state–business interrelations model
With all the positive changes of the early 2000s, certain
gray zones remained in the relations between state and6 The Yukos affair in 2003 ended this practice of regular high-level
consultations between government and big businesses.
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lations. The famous “shashlik meeting” between Vladimir
Putin and oligarchs in June 2000 resulted in an informal
contract between big business and the state: big business
would not interfere in politics and the government would
not revise the privatization results (Hanson & Teague,
2005). However, unlike the tax discussions, which resul-
ted in the tax reform, that arrangement remained strictly
informal. Moreover, oligarchs understood property gua-
rantees to mean the right to obtain full income from
properties, while representatives of the top bureaucratic
elite thought otherwise. That ambiguity became the
ground for revision of the arrangements when social dif-
ferentiation started growing, and the rise in the global
market’s oil prices entailed the occurrence of a new sig-
niﬁcant rent source.
It should be noted that fast economic growth nearly
always intensiﬁes social differentiation. That process was
also observed in Russia in the early 2000s when, the gaps
between rich and poor regions, different sectors, and social
groups started to increase. The federal bureaucratic elite
perceived that tendency as dangerous, because mainte-
nance of social stability was one of the fundamentals of the
existing political regime.
As a result, the state needed additional resources to
decrease social differentiation, and the natural rent was
considered to be the main source of such resources.
Therefore, by introducing a new mineral resources extrac-
tion tax, the state tried to redistribute oil export earnings in
its favor. Big business resisted the tax because such policy
was perceived as an encroachment on its proﬁts. The
business resistance (most evident on the part of the largest
Russian oil company, YUKOS) became apparent in stone-
walling, through “friendly” State Duma deputies, a number
of bills initiated by the government and in ﬁnancial support
to opposition parties, including CPRF and Yabloko.
Nevertheless, the power balance between the state and
business had already changed by that time (Hanson, 2005;
Sakwa, 2009). The topmembers of the bureaucratic elite de
facto nationalized YUKOS and sent its former owners to
prison by relying on security services and law enforcement
agencies (siloviki) as part of building a power vertical.
Criminal cases initiated against the owners of YUKOS were
obviously a selective application of the law, considering
that almost all large companies used similar schemes of tax
optimization at this time. Nevertheless, as the results of the
2003–4 parliamentary and presidential elections demon-
strated, the public broadly supported the state’s actions
against YUKOS (Yakovlev, 2006). In my opinion, this sup-
port derived from thewidespread feeling in society that the
results of the privatization process were not just, which
was a sentiment that big business had ignored.
This speciﬁc model of negotiation between business and
state in the beginning of the 2000s supported high eco-
nomic growth and provided, for many elite groups, access
to the rent associated with this growth. But some inﬂuen-
tial actors considered this type of state–business interac-
tion too costly – especially in face of opportunities to
capture and control the rent associated with natural re-
sources. In my opinion, it was the main reason for the
YUKOS affair. However, this conﬂict led to the collapse ofrelatively equal dialogue between the state and business
that took place at the beginning of the 2000s. In 2003–
2004, this model was replaced by the undoubted domi-
nance of the state. Big business became a junior partner,
subordinate to the state, and the key players became the
top federal bureaucracy and siloviki. During this period, the
“state people” believed that they knew everything and did
not need any outside advice. Evidence of this supreme
conﬁdence appeared after the resignation of Prime Minis-
terMikhail Kasyanov’s government when the state adopted
an active industrial policy (e.g., creating the Investment
Fund, special economic zones and state corporations) and
forced big business to secure state approval for all inter-
national agreements.
5. 2008–2009 crisis and its consequences
Many liberal experts did not like this state-dominated
model of capitalism (see, for instance, Ledeneva, 2012).
Nevertheless, it is necessary to admit that much of what the
government did coincided with the interests and expecta-
tions of a signiﬁcant number of market players. For
example, the restoration of a uniﬁed economic space,
which was the result of bringing the regional governors in
line, was proﬁtable for most ordinary businesses. The same
proﬁtability was observed concerning the relations be-
tween the government and large business. While it is
possible to support various opinions regarding what was
done to YUKOS, most players did not like the Seven Bankers
era of 1996–8, when economic policy was obviously sub-
ordinated to the interests of several large companies.
Therefore, most business people perceived the dominating
role of the state in the new rules of the game as the ‘lesser
evil’.
An important factor in support of this policy was that in
the beginning and middle of the 2000s, the state primarily
did what it had previously promised to the public. While
one could disagree with the methods used to remove the
oligarchs from participating in politics or with forcing the
regions into the “power vertical” system, the state set
speciﬁc goals and subsequently implemented them. As a
result, people began to share a feeling of consistency and
predictability in policy, which facilitated the formation of
positive expectations for long-term social and political
stability and opened a door to active foreign investments
into Russia in 2006–7. Representatives of the middle class
who were not happy with the situation within the country
had the opportunity to leave Russia, due to the high de-
mand for specialists in other countries. This migration
allowed the country to let off steam.
However, the 2008–2009 crisis demonstrated that the
state capitalism model was inherently unstable. In reality,
the system of vertical power relies on federal bureaucracy
as its main social base. Even before the crisis this system
had worked only when signals from the top level met the
interests and expectations of the people at lower levels of
the bureaucratic hierarchy. At the same time, a serious
built-in defect of that model was the asymmetry in infor-
mation signals passing, which is typical to large hierarchic
systems: the lower-level bureaucrats readily reported their
success, but were in no hurry to inform the higher
7 Changes in economic agents’ behavior, which took place in Russia
after the 2008–2009 global economic crisis, can be correlated with the
strategies described as ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ in classical work (Hirschman,
1970). According to Hirschman’s approach, the exit strategy is shown in
the fact that an agent (whether it be a ﬁrm, an employee, a household or
an elector), unsatisﬁed with that market functioning conditions, leaves it
(votes with the feet). On the contrary, the voice strategy assumes that an
agent tends to inﬂuence the market in order to change the rules and bring
them in line with his interests. A. Hirschman shows that the lower the
competition in the system is and the narrower the exit possibilities are,
the higher the probability is that the agent will choose the voice strategy.
It is worth noting, that realization of both strategies is inﬂuenced by the
degree of loyalty – to a brand (in case of consumers’ behavior), to orga-
nization (for employees), or to a country (for citizens and investors). In
our opinion, for the 2004–2007 period, we can speak of the simultaneous
purchase of loyalty and broad options for implementation of the exit
strategy or voting with feet. That situation changed in 2009 when, due to
the change of the external economic situation and increased social ex-
penditures, the rent volume sharply dropped, and the pressure on the
elite increased for the purpose of its redistribution. At the same time, the
exit strategies for successful representatives of the middle class shrank,
due to the reduction of demand for skilled foreign specialists in devel-
oped countries.
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sponsibility. Accordingly, during the crisis, it became clear
that the authorities knew far from everything what was
happening and had only limited capability to take action.
Particularly up to December 2008, the government
leaders on all central TV channels were telling the audi-
ence that Russia had only a few problems with the stock
market and banking sector caused by the bankruptcy of
American companies and ﬁnancial institutions. However,
in reality, large enterprises in metallurgy and chemical
industries in summer 2008 came across a sharp drop in
demand and prices on global markets, and in August–
September, these companies started to put workers on
forced leave. Under these circumstances, owners and top
managers understood that the government was not aware
of what was happening in the real sector. Later the sense
of inadequacy of the economic policy only strengthened,
when the government started to combine promises to
save everybody and the on-budget expenditures sequester
with the simultaneous rise of unemployment beneﬁts,
which exceeded the average salary level in a number of
regions.
Due to the government measures and the global
ﬁnancial crisis, many company owners quite rationally
preferred to put their businesses on hold and wait until
the government clariﬁed its economic policy. As a result,
in 2009, the Russian economy lost 8 percent of its GDP, a
ﬁgure that was out of line with contemporary economic
indicators. In contrast to the Eastern European countries
and Mexico, Russia did not have a signiﬁcant external
debt, did not face a large budget deﬁcit, and was not
suffering from high inﬂation. Rather, contradictory signals
from the government resulted in negative expectations
regarding government policy and drove the economic
contraction.
That destruction of expectations happened not only
among market agents but also on the side of the state
machinery itself. During the years of economic boom of the
mid-2000s, representatives of the bureaucracy gained
informal control over cash ﬂows of many entities in both
the public and the private sectors. Before the crisis, these
representatives had expected to draw dividends from that
control for many years, which, to a certain extent,
decreased the current corruption load on business. How-
ever, under sharply increased levels of uncertainty, these
people determined that it was more prudent to extract
maximum revenue as quickly as possible, which entailed
increased corruption and violent pressure on businesses
(Firestone, 2010; Gans-Morse, 2012; Zhalinsky & Rad-
chenko, 2011a, 2011b). These changes provoked businesses
to respond with an intense capital outﬂow from the
country.
Finally, the crisis also induced a change of mood in the
society. Qualiﬁed specialists belonging to the middle class,
who did not accept life under the managed democracy and
who earlier could consider the possibility of emigration,
now observed that because of the global crisis, the demand
for their services in developed countries dropped. It meant
that they and their children would have to live in Russia.
Therefore, it is possible to view themassive protests against
the electoral fraud at the end of 2011 as a result of the crisis:the protests represented an outburst of accumulated social
tension, which earlier would have resulted in emigration.7
6. New positive trends
Despite all of the points listed above, in my view, there
are some reasons for optimism. The theses about
modernizing the economy announced by President Med-
vedev in 2008 and the series of serious reforms conducted
in 2004–8 (including the reform of public procurement in
2005–6, the decision to force public employees to declare
their income, and others) demonstrate that the authorities
understand the need for change. However, before 2008, in
the absence of signiﬁcant pressure from outside or below
(from non-elite layers of society), the ruling coalition was
not ready to change the rules of the game or impose limits
on the elite.
The 2008–2009 crisis and the resulting changes in the
world market led to increased pressure on Russian au-
thorities. Initially, that pressure originated on the outside –
due to reduction of the natural rent available for distribu-
tion and intense capital ﬂight to countries with a more
favorable investment climate. However, the pressure later
began to strengthen from the inside – due to the change in
expectations and a split among elites and the change of the
public mood. At the same time the authorities understood
that they could not rely on bureaucracy (or the power
vertical system) as the regime’s social base. During the
crisis, it became obvious that the bureaucracy, including
the law-enforcement system, which was built up vertically
in the 2000s, did not correspond to the interests of society
or the will of higher-level decision-makers.
As a result, the authorities had to adopt signiﬁcant
policy changes in reaction to domestic and international
pressure in the post-crisis period. The authorities recog-
nized that economic growth is necessary for preserving
social stability, which is a key requirement for the func-
tioning of the regime. However, supporting the high rates
of economic growth against the background of unstable
international market conditions can only work in
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in Russia. This situation, in my opinion, led the authorities
to turn toward a dialogue with business and to seek feed-
back from the business community beginning in 2010 and
2011.
The government is clearly focusing on the medium-
sized businesses and hopes to integrate them into the
social base of the regime. Contrary to widely held opinion,
this group of Russian ﬁrms is not small. According to a
special project initiated by the Expert magazine, in 2006
there were approximately 13,000 companies with annual
revenue of between 10 and 400 million dollars and the
total sales of these ﬁrms were about 80% of the large en-
terprises’ (Vin’kov, Gurova, Polunin, & Yudanov, 2008;
Yudanov, 2010). Moreover, the medium sized enterprises
have the greatest growth potential, which has motivated
the new focus of governmental policy (Kuznetsov et al.,
2011; Yakovlev, Simachev, & Danilov, 2010). At the same
time, due to the lack of sufﬁcient political connections,
this group of ﬁrms became an object for violent pressure
from bureaucracy and law enforcement structures. Before
the crisis, the side effects of the bad business climate were
compensated by its high proﬁtability, but that high
margin does not exist anymore, while the business bar-
riers remain in place.
The ﬁrst signs of this change in policy toward interests
of medium-sized business were important amendments to
the Criminal code and Criminal procedure code adopted by
the State Duma in 2009 and coming into effect in 2010.
These amendments restricted the pretrial arrests and other
application of criminal sanctions on entrepreneurs
(Firestone, 2011).
In May 2010, the Russian government, following best
practice of European countries, introduced the Regula-
tory Impact Assessment (RIA). This is the procedure
stipulating that federal laws in draft, decrees of the
Russian President, and resolutions of the Russian Federal
Government should be analyzed for exposure of pro-
visions, which a) introduce excessive administrative
limitations for entrepreneurs, and b) make entrepreneurs
and budgets at all levels of the ﬁscal system of the RF get
involved in groundless expenditures. The key elements of
the RIA procedure are public hearings with spokesmen of
leading organizations representing interests of the busi-
ness community.
Initially, the RIA procedures functioned only on the
federal level and were applied to legislative acts con-
cerning organization and implementation of public con-
trol, setting of technical and quality standards, and
introducing production safety requirements. According to
the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian
Federation, more than 1700 legislative acts were evalu-
ated in 2010–2012 (http://www.rg.ru/2013/02/21/biznes-
site.html). In 2012, a decision was made to introduce the
RIA on the regional level, beginning in 2013, as well as to
extend the RIA to amendments to tax and custom
regulation.
The next step in the elaboration of the “new policy” of
the government can be connected with two big analytical
projects pushed in 2010. The ﬁrst was the ‘Doing Business
in Russia’ project commissioned by the Ministry ofEconomic Development to theWorld Bank, with the idea of
comparing conditions for starting businesses, registering
property, obtaining construction permits, and getting ac-
cess to electricity in 30 regions (see www.doingbusiness.
org/russia). The second was the Russian BEEPS survey of
4300 ﬁrms in 37 regions (including 30 covered by ‘Doing
Business in Russia’ project). The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ﬁnanced the standard
BEEPS sample for Russia in the framework of this project
(about 1000 ﬁrms) and the rest of money was provided by
the state corporation “The Bank for Development and
Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)”. Both of
these projects demonstrated signiﬁcant differences in
business climate conditions between Russian regions and
gave arguments for changes in the incentives system for
regional governments.
As we stressed above, the 2008–2009 crisis revealed the
absence of feedback mechanisms in public administration
in Russia. Recognition of this fact led to the search for new
means of state–business interaction. One of them was the
Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI), which was proposed
by Vladimir Putin in summer 2011 after a number of
meetings with entrepreneurs. As these meetings showed,
there were substantial barriers to the realization of busi-
ness initiatives, and the state machinery had no incentive
to eliminate these barriers.
The ASI was established by the Russian Government
as an autonomous non-commercial organization. Mr.
Putin is the chairman of the ASI supervisory board. The
ofﬁcially declared goal of ASI is the “creation of prospects
for self-realization of young ambitious leaders who are
able to lead Russia to the front line in the world”. The
Agency’s mission includes promotion of projects and
initiatives put forward by fast-growing medium-sized
businesses and social sector leaders, growth in the
number of new leaders emerging in medium-sized
business and in the social sector, and general improve-
ment of the business climate. To achieve these goals,
substantial funds were provided to the ASI, and the
Agency could invite to its staff (which amounted to about
150 employees) a number of qualiﬁed experts with
business experience. For follow-up on the projects, ASI
invited well-known consulting ﬁrms, including the Bos-
ton Consulting Group.
The further tasks of the ASI were deﬁned in Putin’s
February 2012 campaign statement (see http://premier.gov.
ru/eng/events/news/17888/) and subsequent decrees on
economic policy, which aimed to improve Russia’s position
on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking from
120th to 20th place, change the way the governors and
federal agencies are evaluated, and other measures. The
practical result of ASI’s work was the development of road
maps for reducing barriers in getting construction permits,
changing customs regulations, stimulating exports, and
introducing new standards for regional governments’ ac-
tivity to provide an attractive investment climate. In sum-
mer and autumn of 2012, these “roadmaps”were approved
by the Government and became obligatory for government
ofﬁces. The ASI, in collaboration with 11 regions, has real-
ized a pilot project “Standard of business climate
improvement at the regional level” based on the analysis of
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vestors’ relations. In September 2012, a presidential decree
included indicators of this standard in a system of guber-
natorial activities evaluation.
Another important innovation in the ﬁeld of state–
business relations was the establishment of the post of
Presidential Commissioner for Entrepreneurs’ Rights
and the appointment of Boris Titov to this position in
June 2012.8 According to the federal law adopted by the
State Duma in April 2013, positions of commissioners
for entrepreneurs’ rights were introduced in all regions
of the Russian Federation. As an ‘ombudsman for en-
trepreneurs’, Titov pushed a number of initiatives in
2012–2013, including re-examination of criminal cases
against entrepreneurs and a proposal about broad am-
nesty of entrepreneurs who faced criminal prosecution
in the 2000s (see details at http://www.ombudsmanbiz.
ru/).
Both ASI and the ombudsman for entrepreneurs’ ofﬁce
are working in close cooperation with leading business
associations. Their activities help discover effective ofﬁcials
inside the present public administration, to establish hor-
izontal links between them, and to disseminate best prac-
tices. However, the ultimate effects of the activities of ASI
and the ombudsman for entrepreneurs will depend on the
will and ability of the Kremlin to appoint and promote top-
level ofﬁcials according to their efforts to invite in-
vestments and to create incentive for economic growth,
rather than by the criteria of their political loyalty and
personal commitment.7. A reverse side of the coin
I cannot say that all these measures pushed by ASI or
Boris Titov and supported by the Ministry of Economic
Development and theMinistry of Finance have resulted in a
real change in the business climate in Russia. Moreover, ASI
experts believe that regional governments and federal
agencies have quickly learned how to build “dummy
panels” with a purely formalistic response to the orders
from above without any changes in the real practice of
interaction with business.
However, the events of early 2013 indicated that the
absence of any effects in the new policy of relations with
business is not solely due to covert resistance at middle
and low levels of bureaucratic hierarchy. There are
inﬂuential groups in the Russian elite who deny, in
principle, any need to meet the interests of business and,
on the contrary, insist on toughening of regulations and
on ﬁrmer control and supervision. These groups are
represented, ﬁrst of all, by law enforcement and con-
trolling agencies, or the siloviki – such as the Investiga-
tive Committee, the Ofﬁce of Prosecutor General, the
Federal Security Service, the Federal Customs Service,
the Federal Tax Service, the Accounting Chamber of8 See Clover Charles, Catherine Belton and Courtney Weaver (2012)
‘Putin seeks to reassure foreign investors’//Financial Times, June 21, 2012
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/84ae0acc-bba7-11e1-9436-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UvfVrlfg accessed on May 31, 2013).Russia, and a number of other agencies. By tradition, top
managers of a number of state-owned companies and
state corporations, including the President of Rosneft
Company Igor Sechin and the President of the Russian
Railways Vladimir Yakunin, are also associated with the
group of siloviki.
In the post-crisis period, general consolidation of the
positions of this group of Russian elite was related to a
number of circumstances. Firstly, the crisis aggravated
the issue of corruption. Having faced visible toughening
of budget constraints in 2009 and in the following years,
the Kremlin and the Federal Government made an
attempt to curb the losses from corruption, which had
expanded under the state capitalism of the mid-2000s.
However, the ﬁght against corruption was conducted by
strictly administrative methods – by reliance on stricter
formal control over spending of public funds and over
public procurement procedures. This policy, despite
numerous criminal cases, failed to bring a decline in the
level of actual corruption – because under the superﬂu-
ous and controversial system of administrative regula-
tions established in the 2000s, practically any Russian
public ofﬁcial who made decisions on allocation of funds
could be accused of violation of some regulations.
Nevertheless, the anti-corruption campaign resulted in a
substantial rise in the inﬂuence of security and law
enforcement agencies.
Secondly, the crisis of 2008–2009 and the related
uncertainty of economic policies led to heavy capital
outﬂow from Russia. The Government responded to this
outﬂow directly with an attempt to carry out stronger
persecution of entrepreneurs for tax evasion and use of
offshore networks. Another argument in favor of tougher
administrative regulation and control was a great num-
ber of accidents related to the most blatant violations of
safety requirements by entrepreneurs, which had caused
many deaths. Actually, this command to make in-
vestigations was an additional way of exerting “power
pressure” on business. In a certain sense, it gave rise to
reciprocal collective actions on the side of business
community, who started to lobby liberal amendments to
the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure,
changes in the practice of law enforcement, and the
introduction of regulatory impact assessment
procedures.
Thirdly, political protests in 2011–2012 played a sub-
stantial role in consolidating the positions of the siloviki.
In particular, just after the mass protests against electoral
fraud in December 2011, the Government announced
large-scale expansion of ﬁnancing the army, the Ministry
of Interior, and securities services. Criminal cases were
opened against the most active representatives of polit-
ical opposition. In 2012, a law “On Foreign Agents” was
enacted in order to impose substantial limitations on
activities of non-governmental organizations (NGO), and
in spring of 2013, the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce launched
a campaign to reveal the “foreign agents”. Finally, the
Investigative Committee instituted legal proceedings
against the experts who had conducted an independent
assessment of the second criminal case against the
owners of Yukos Co on behalf of Human Rights Council,
9 Meanwhile, as rightly mentioned Vadim Volkov, this decision to grant
amnesty does not change the practice of law enforcement and gives no
guarantee against continuation of power pressure on entrepreneurs (see:
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/13809211/amnistiya-
predprinimatelej-eto-tolko-pervyj-shag).
10 However, this does not prevent some groups from presenting such
scenarios in their own interests.
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2013, these activities of the Investigative Committee
made one of leading Russian economists, Sergei Guriev,
practically emigrate from Russia (http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/01/world/europe/economist-sergei-guriev-
doesnt-plan-return-to-russia-soon.html?_r¼0). More-
over, the activities of these “power agencies” show a link
between political and economic issues. In particular, in
late April 2013, the Russian Investigative Committee
initiated a search in Alma-Ata in the apartment of the
founders of “The Center for Legal and Economic Studies”,
who had organized assessment of the second Yukos
Affair for the Human Rights Council. As follows from a
resolution of the Basmanny Court of Justice in Moscow,
which was shown at this search, the alleged fault of
founders of this Center was that they” had published
monographs and issued publications in mass media
insisting on the need for amendments in the Russian
criminal legislation. This created an illusion of necessity to
liberalize criminal legislation, and following the interests
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, amendments in Russian legis-
lation were made” (see http://www.novayagazeta.ru/
politics/58386.html, italics added).
Such shifts in political life were accompanied by the
development of an ideological grounding for the “mobili-
zation scenario”. In this context, the activityof the “Izborskiy
Club”, which was established in September 2012, deserves
attention. Economists Mikhail Delyagin and Sergey Glazyev
and political journalists Alexander Prokhanov and Mikhail
Kalashnikov became key experts of this new think tank. The
main propositions of the Club’s Manifesto (http://www.
dynacon.ru/content/articles/1039/), prepared in October
2012 and published in January 2013, include accelerated
development of the military–industrial complex, posi-
tioning of public sector as the “core” of national economy,
and a requirement to renew and cleanse the national elite.
The experts of the “Izborskiy Club” believe that all these
measures are predetermined by the increase of geopolitical
struggle for control over resources. This strugglewill lead to
regional wars, larger wars in Eurasia or Africa, armed in-
terventions intomany countries, especially thosewith large
unexplored resources (minerals, water, land) and an new
Worldwar cannot be ruled out. The experts of the “Izborskiy
Club” name Peter the Great and Josef Stalin as the main
heroes of Russian history, and regard Stalin’s industrializa-
tion as the model for the “project of mobilization” today.
Russian mass media described the “Izborskiy Club”,
since the very beginning of its activity, as a think tank close
to the Kremlin (http://www.kp.ru/daily/25946/2890297/;
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2102396). It is worth
mentioning that public statements made by the Vice-
Premier Dmitry Rogozin extensively repeat the arguments
of the “Izborskiy Club” (http://oko-planet.su/politik/
politiklist/170055-dmitriy-rogozin-ugrozy-
sovremennogo-mira-kak-tolko-ty-demonstriruesh-
slabost-tebya-ubyut.html; http://www.rg.ru/2013/07/04/
voyna.html). Statements of a number of experts from the
All-Russian National Front made after the Front’s conven-
tion in June 2013 (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/
2209932; http://www.itar-tass.com/c12/766965.html) are
also close to the ideas of the Club.8. Conclusion
Despite the negative shifts of 2011–2012, which I have
mentioned in the previous section, it would be wrong to
conclude that the Russian top political elite made its choice
in favor of an anti-market “mobilization scenario”. Steps
towards business still continue. In particular, regardless of
the siloviki’s resistance, Vladimir Putin ﬁnally supported
the project of amnesty for entrepreneurs, which had been
proposed by Boris Titov (http://www.vedomosti.ru/
politics/news/12380081/dlya_amnistii_slishkomsyro;
http://kremlin.ru/news/18403).9 The fact that Alexander
Galushka from Delovaya Rossiya (‘Business Russia’) in June
2012 became one of three co-chairmen of the All-Russian
National Front can be regarded as a display of attention to
business interests (http://onf.ru/structure/rukovodstvo/hq/
). At the same time, Delovaya Rossiya and OPORA of Russia
submitted a proposal for a two-year-long tax exemption for
newly registered individual entrepreneurs, which was
supported by the Kremlin (“Izvestia”, July 8, 2013: http://
izvestia.ru/news/553258).
Therefore, rather, we can say that the Russian elite is
standing at a crossroads. On one hand, Russia is in acute need
ofmodernization in order to successfully competewith other
developed and developing economies. Modernization and
improvements in efﬁciency of resource deployment are the
very means for giving new incentives for economic growth,
which the ruling elite needs in order to maintain social sta-
bility and prevent political protests. The “new business” –
successful midsized companies that grew up on the tide of
the economic boom in the 2000s – can become the driving
force of this modernization. These companies have strong
teams of managers; they know the Russianmarket and have
sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources. However, to realize their po-
tential, these companies need a competitive environment
and protection of property rights. This implies, ﬁrstly, that
unlawful actions of law enforcement bodiesmust be limited,
and the independence of the court system must be guaran-
teed. In terms of NNW, such measures would mean “rule of
law for the elite” and expansion of access to business op-
portunities for the new economic agents.
However, practical steps in this direction bump into the
position of ruling elite, which is fearful of political protests
(with concern that an “Arab Spring” could emerge in
Russia). This fear is the foundation of the increasing inﬂu-
ence of law enforcement bodies, which began to dominate
not only over business, but over the entire bureaucratic
machine, state corporations, and large-scale public sector
organizations. This fear is the “culture medium” for pro-
jects of “new mobilization” in the spirit of the “Izborskiy
Club”. And although in practice, hardly anyone in the
Russian elite believes in earnest that such scenarios can
guarantee steady economic development,10 the very fact
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of law enforcement bodies is producing very strong nega-
tive signals to business and bureaucratic elite.
These signals, essentially, cancel out all effects of at-
tempts to improve the business climate. In particular, I
believe, political reasons alone explain the sharp deceler-
ation of economic growth and the increase in capital ﬂight
from Russia since the beginning of 2013.11 Moreover, these
signals rouse negative expectations not only in the business
environment, but also in the state machinery (including its
highest levels). Consolidation of law enforcement bodies in
the absence of a positive program, which could take into
account the interests of the main elite groups, is under-
stood as nothing but an attempt of the ruling top to hold on
its power as long as possible – until an inevitable collapse
of this regime and a reiteration of the chaos of the early
1990s.
In other words, the Russian elite is facing a choice –
either to carry out economic modernization “from above”
relying on coercion from the center, or to rely on the in-
centives and initiatives of economic agents themselves. It is
not the ﬁrst time in Russian history this choice has been
faced: let us remember the late 1920s and the period from
the 1950s to the 1960s. However, the present phase has
substantial distinctions.
Firstly, the composition of social groups that can be
losers in a turn to the “mobilization scenario” is much
wider. They are not only owners and managers of big and
mid-sized business, but also people from other elitist
groups – including the federal and regional bureaucracy,
managers of state corporations, and public sector organi-
zations. Secondly, all these actors have acquired, in the last
twenty years, new and very important skills and knowl-
edge – having had practice living in a market environment
(however imperfect it is), in an atmosphere of open infor-
mation. Consequently, an attempt to “strengthen the reins
of power” can meet much more resistance in the elite. And
strictly because people in the elite have acquired new
knowledge and experience, there aremore opportunities to
ﬁnd compromises in settlements, which will be capable of
ensuring the balance of political and economic interests
and to prevent a reiteration of the year 1991.
In Russia, the choice of development scenarios will
depend on howmuch the present ruling top will be able to
look beyond its narrow interests and to enter dialogue with
other elite groups (including not only business but also
regional elites and the public sector entities). In turn, the
readiness of the top elite to conduct this dialogue will
largely depend on whether the above mentioned wide
social groups will be able to reach an agreement about
collective action and to work out a new unifying and11 In May 2013, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
published a forecast of deceleration of economic growth rate in Russia in
2013 to 1.8% – from the estimated 3.5% made by the EBRD experts in the
beginning of 2013. In January–June 2013, capital ﬂight exceeded $38
billion – in comparison with the preliminary predictive estimates of $10
billion for the entire 2013, made by the Central Bank of Russia. I must
underline that this “creeping into a recession” took place against the
background of stability of all macroeconomic indicators, including oil
prices, inﬂation, external debt, etc.pragmatic agenda. I believe that this dialogue will begin,
and that Russia has a chance to ﬁnd a new model of
development, allowing it to give answers to domestics and
external challenges without bringing risks of political
destabilization.
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